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Keynote Speech
Balancing Investor Protection with Capital Formation
Needs After the SEC Chamber of Commerce Case
David S. Ruder'
On June 21, 2005, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission had not met its rule making cost justification burden in
adopting an important rule under the Investment Company Act of 1940
(the "Investment Company Act"). 2 In Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America v. Securities and Exchange Commission
3
("Chamber of Commerce Case") the court held that the Commission had
violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 4 in two respects when
it adopted an Investment Company Act rule requiring seventy-five
percent of the members of the board of directors of each registered
investment company to be independent of its investment adviser and
requiring the chairman of the board to be independent of the adviser.5
1. The author is the William W. Gurley Memorial Professor of Law Emeritus at
Northwestern University School of Law. He was Chairman of the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission from 1987 to 1989. He was ably assisted in
preparation of this article by Pamela Hawkins Williams, a 2004 graduate of Northwestern
University School of Law. This article is an expansion of the keynote address delivered
by Professor Ruder at The Investor Rights Symposium presented by the Pace Investor
Rights Project at Pace Law School on March 31 and April 1, 2005. The Symposium
brochure raised the topic of securities law investor protections as they affect capital
market operation, as follows:
While the principle that investors should be protected from securities fraud was
established with the enactment of federal securities legislation in the 1930s, the
optimal manner of protection continues to be hotly debated, as scholars, regulators
and policymakers seek the appropriate balance between protecting investors and
encouraging capital formation. This symposium will explore the current balance
in various areas of the securities industry.
Pace Law School, Investor Rights Symposium, http://www.law.pace.edu/pirp/symp
osium.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
2. Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 1-65, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2005)
[hereinafter Investment Company Act].
3. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("Chamber of
Commerce Case").
4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521
(2005).
5. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,381 (Aug. 4, 2004)
1
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The court held that the Commission violated the Investment
Company Act by "failing adequately to consider the costs mutual funds
would incur' 6 in order to comply with the-Investment Company Act
requirement that it determine "whether the action will promote
efficiency, competition and capital formation" 7 and by "failing
adequately to consider a proposed alternative to the independent
chairman condition." 8
The Chamber of Commerce Case raises important questions
regarding the SEC's dual roles of protecting investors and promoting
capital formation. Although the court did not hold that the Commission
exceeded its authority in adopting the rule, it remanded the matter to the
Commission directing it to show further justification for the rule.9 Its
conclusion that the Commission must "determine as best it can the
economic implications"'10 of its rule making means that in subsequent
rule making the Commission should take particular care in examining the
effects on capital formation of the rule being adopted.
This article discusses the Chamber of Commerce Case, examines
the Commission's duties to consider the impact of its activities on capital
formation, and offers some views regarding the SEC's obligations to
determine whether its various programs promote or impede capital
formation.
The SEC's Dual Role: Protecting Investors and Facilitating
Capital Formation
Wealth creation has long been a central theme of American
prosperity. The accumulation of assets made available for investment in
business enterprises has been an important factor in the success of the
United States economy.
As the United States has grown, the form of ownership of assets has
progressed from simple individual ownership of land, buildings, and
machinery to sophisticated vehicles for asset accumulation. Productive
assets are now owned by individuals, partnerships, limited liability
companies, corporations, trusts, and others.
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
6. Chamber of Commerce Case, 412 F.3d at 136.
7. Investment Company Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c) (2005).
8. Chamber of Commerce Case, 412 F.3d at 136.
9. Id. at 145.
10. Id. at 143.
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Corporations have provided the most dynamic form of ownership,
since their artificial form has enabled them to operate large scale
enterprises by accumulating assets in greater amounts than can be
gathered by an individual or a few individuals. The ability of
corporations to accumulate assets in large amounts is increased when
corporate shareholders can easily sell their shares to others, allowing
them to invest in other enterprises or to make other uses of their assets.
Easy transfer of assets into new enterprises and uses means that the
economy can prosper through innovation and growth and that the cost of
capital will be lower. Business growth in the United States has in part
been due to the availability of securities markets that facilitate these easy
transfers. This ease of transfer can be attributed to "liquidity" in the U.S.
securities markets where large amounts of securities can be purchased
and sold without disrupting the pricing mechanism.
Following the stock market crash in 1929, a series of federal
securities statutes were enacted in the United States designed to improve
the operation of our securities markets. Today the SEC administers ten
major laws designed to protect investors. ' ' The Securities and Exchange
Commission was created as an independent government agency charged
with administration of those statutes.1
2
The federal securities statutes emphasize the need for corporate and
market honesty and integrity as a means of protecting investors. They
mandate adequate disclosure of information, prohibit dishonesty and
fraud in the sale and purchase of securities, and require brokers, dealers,
investment advisers and other market professionals to act in the best
interests of investors.
Although the primary objective of requiring honesty is to protect
investors, honesty also improves market efficiency. Honest markets will
be more liquid, since investors will be more likely to risk their resources
11. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 1-28, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2005) [hereinafter
Securities Act]; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 1-37, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2005)
[hereinafter Exchange Act]; Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 1935, 15
U.S.C. § 79 (2005); Investment Company Act §§ 1-65, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2005);
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2005); Securities Investor
Protection Act (SIPA) of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (2005); National Securities
Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) of 1996, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-3, 78mm, 80b-3(a)
(2005); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.); Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 11
U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., and 15 U.S.C.); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
12. Exchange Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d.
2005]
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in an honest market. Additionally, since in a dishonest market investors
will seek higher prices for securities as compensation for the risks of loss
due to dishonesty, an honest market will facilitate the transfer of assets at
lower prices, thereby lowering the cost of capital.
Securities and Exchange Commission Consideration of Effects on
Capital Formation
In its rule making, the Commission routinely conducts analysis as
required by statutes, regulations and policies. 3 Typically, the SEC's
rulemaking includes an analysis of the effects on "Efficiency,
Competition and Capital Formation" and a "Cost-Benefit Analysis.' 4 It
does not conduct this analysis in its other activities, such as enforcement.
The various securities acts mandate investor protection, but they
also recognize that regulation of securities markets should facilitate
capital formation. The SEC includes capital formation in its mission
statement, which says that: "The mission of the Securities and Exchange
Commission is to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets; and facilitate capital formation." 5
Statutory imposition of the duty to facilitate market efficiency,
competition, and capital formation is contained in various securities acts.
The Securities Act and Exchange Act require the Commission, when
engaged in rule making, to consider "in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation., 16  The Investment Company Act requires
13. Securities & Exchange Commission, Audit No. 347, Rulemaking Process (July
12, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/347fin.htm (discussing the Commission's
rulemaking process) [hereinafter Rulemaking Audit].
14. Id. In addition, the Commission reviews compliance with the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521
(2005), the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2005), the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2005), and the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 657, 801-808 (2005).
15. United States Securities & Exchange Commission, 2004-2009 Strategic Plan
(2004), http://www.sec.gov/about/secstratplan0409.pdf [hereinafter SEC Strategic Plan].
16. Securities Act section 2(b) provides:
Consideration of promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission is engaged in rulemaking
and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition
to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2005).
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consideration of "efficiency, competition, and capital formation" in
Commission rule making. 7 These requirements are triggered in each of
these statutes when the SEC adopts a rule that requires it to "consider the
public interest or to determine that a rule's adoption is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest."
' 18
Cost-Benefit Analysis
As an independent regulatory agency, the SEC is not required under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 19 to conduct a "cost-benefit
analysis" when it adopts rules. President Ronald Reagan issued
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 in the 1980s requiring federal
agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis when making rules.2°
Exchange Act section 3(f) provides:
Consideration of promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
Whenever pursuant to this title, the Commission is engaged in rulemaking, or in
the review of a rule of a self-regulatory organization, and is required to consider or
determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether
the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2005).
See also Exchange Act section 23(a)(2):
The Commission and the Secretary of the Treasury, in making rules and
regulations pursuant to any provisions of this title, shall consider among other
matters the impact any such rule or regulation would have on competition. The
Commission and the Secretary of the Treasury shall not adopt any such rule or
regulation which would impose a burden on competition not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. The Commission and
the Secretary of the Treasury shall include in the statement of basis and purpose
incorporated in any rule or regulation adopted under this title, the reasons for the
Commission's or the Secretary's determination that any burden on competition
imposed by such rule or regulation is necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2) (2005).
17. Investment Company Act section 2(c) provides:
Consideration of promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission is engaged in rulemaking
and is required to consider or determine whether an action is consistent with the
public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c) (2005).
18. Id.; Rulemaking Audit, supra note 13.
19. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521
(2005).
20. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,036 (Jan. 4, 1985); Exec. Order No.
2005]
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However, these orders and their subsequent replacements, Executive
Orders 12,866 and 13,258, specifically exempted independent regulatory
agencies, such as the SEC, from this requirement. 21 Nevertheless, SEC
officials have acknowledged that the cost-benefit analysis is "becoming
increasingly significant., 22  When it adopts rules the Commission
includes a "Cost-Benefit Analysis," in which it analyzes the "potential
costs and benefits" of its rules.2 3 Commission officials believe that the
cost-benefit analysis represents "accepted standards of good practice in
conducting rulemaking proceedings" and that its use aligns with the "best
practice principles in Executive Order 12,866. ''24
The Chamber of Commerce Case
The Chamber of Commerce Case is extremely important to the SEC
because the Circuit Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit provided
guidance to the Commission regarding the steps it needs to take in order
to validate its rule making. The opinion is important not only for the
12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); CHARLES H. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PRACTICE, 1 Admin L. & Prac. § 4.51 (2d ed. 1997). Executive Order 12,291
specifically required a Regulatory Impact Analysis that was interpreted to require some
form of cost-benefit analysis. Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A
Test Case in Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 483, 496-497
(Winter 1988). This cost-benefit analysis is subject to review by the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB"). Damien Geradin, The Development of European
Regulatory Agencies: What the EU Should Learn From American Experience, 1 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 1, 44-45 (Winter 2004/2005).
21. Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,385 (Feb. 26, 2002); Exec. Order No.
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). Executive Order 12,866 specifically
excludes independent agencies in its definition of "Agency" as "any authority of the
United States that is an 'agency' under 44 U.S.C. 3502(1), other than those considered to
be independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(10)." Id. at 51,735 §
3(b). President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 in 1993 to replace Executive
Orders 12,291 and 12,498. President George W. Bush later made minor changes to
Executive Order 12,866 with the issuance of Executive Order 13,258. Both revisions
essentially adopted the main features of the original orders. Geradin, supra note 20, at
44-45; see also M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1383, 1393, 1447 n.28 (Fall 2004).
22. Rulemaking Audit, supra note 13.
23. It does so in part because of a passage in the House Commerce Committee
report accompanying the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA) of 1996, which states that "[i]n considering efficiency, competition and
capital formation, the Commission shall analyze the potential costs and benefits of any
rulemaking initiative, including, whenever practicable, specific analysis of such costs and
benefits. The Committee expects that the Commission will engage in rigorous analysis
pursuant to this section." H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 39 (June 17, 1996).
24. Rulemaking Audit, supra note 13.
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holdings requiring additional Commission action, but also for its
holdings affirming Commission power in Investment Company Act rule
making and its confirmations of certain aspects of the SEC's procedures.
In the Chamber of Commerce Case, the Chamber attacked two new
conditions imposed by the SEC to be used by investment companies
(usually called "mutual funds") 25 of ten exemptive rules 26 allowing
companies to engage in otherwise prohibited transactions. The
challenged provisions inserted into each rule required that in order to
engage in certain transactions otherwise prohibited under the Investment
Company Act, a mutual fund "must have a board (1) with no less than
75% independent directors and (2) an independent chairman.' 27
Independent directors are directors who are not "interested persons" as
defined in Section 2(a)(la) of the Act.28
25. The Investment Company Act regulates "investment companies," as defined in
section 3. Investment Company Act, §§ 1, 3, 80a-1 to -3. The Supreme Court has
defined "a mutual fund" as "a pool of assets ... belonging to the individual investors
holding shares in the fund." Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979)). In this article, most
references will be to "mutual funds," which are one type of investment company
regulated by the Investment Company Act. See Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,
624 (1971).
26. The exemptive rules permit actions otherwise prohibited under the Investment
Company Act if the fund directors, including a majority of the independent directors, take
appropriate actions. The exemptive rules are:
Rule l0f-3 (fund purchases of securities underwritten by an affiliated broker-
dealer);
Rule 12b- 1 (use of fund assets to pay distribution expense);
Rule 15a-4(b)(2) (board approval of an interim advisory contract);
Rule 17a-7 (securities transaction between a fund and a client of its investment
adviser);
Rule 17a-8 (mergers between affiliated funds);
Rule 17d- I (d)(7) (purchase of joint liability insurance contracts);
Rule 17e-1 (payment of commissions to affiliated brokers in exchange
transactions);
Rule 17g- I (maintenance of joint insured bonds);
Rule 18f-3 (issuance of multiple classes of voting stock); and
Rule 23c-3 (repurchase of shares in closed end funds).
Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,381 (Aug. 4, 2004) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
27. Chamber of Commerce Case, 412 F.3d at 136.
28. The definition of "independent directors" as disinterested persons is discussed
in "Best Practices and Practical Guidance for Mutual Fund Directors" as follows:
Directors of a fund who are, among other things, officers, employees or directors
of a fund's adviser are deemed "interested persons" of the fund within the meaning
of the 1940 Act. Directors of a fund not having such affiliations with the adviser
2005]
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In its adopting release the Commission justified the new exemptive
conditions primarily on the theory that since inherent conflicts of
interests exist between funds and the fund advisers who manage fund
assets for fees and who control the fund assets, the "independent
judgment and scrutiny of directors, including independent directors" is
needed to oversee activities that "involve inherent conflicts between the
funds and their managers., 29 Part of the SEC's justification for the new
conditions was that enforcement cases involving late trading, market
timing, and misuse of portfolio information had revealed "a serious
breakdown in management controls.,
30
Two SEC Commissioners dissented from adoption of the revised
rules in part because they believed that the Commission had not given
are typically referred to as "disinterested" directors.
Mutual Fund Directors Forum, Best Practices and Practical Guidance for Mutual Fund
Directors, at 5 n.8 (July, 2004), http://www.mfdf.com/PDFs/best pra.pdf.
Section 1 (a)(1 9)(A) of the Investment Company Act defines an "interested person" of a
fund in pertinent part as:
(i) any affiliated person of the fund; (ii) any member of the immediate family of
any natural person who is an affiliated person of the fund; (iii) any interested
person of any investment adviser of or principal underwriter for the fund; (iv) any
person or partner or employee of any person who at any time since the beginning
of the fund's last two completed fiscal years has acted as its legal counsel; (v) any
person or any affiliated person of a person (other than a registered investment
company) that, at any time during the six month period preceding the date of the
determination of whether that person or affiliated person is an interested person,
has executed any portfolio transactions for, engaged in any principal transactions
with, or distributed shares for the fund, any other fund having the same investment
adviser as the fund or holding itself out to investors as a related fund for purposes
of investment or investor services, or any account over which the fund's
investment adviser has brokerage placement discretion, any person or any
affiliated person of a person (other than a registered investment company) that, at
any time during the six month period preceding the date of the determination of
whether that person or affiliated person is an interested person, has loaned money
or other property to (I) the fund; (II) any other fund having the same investment
adviser as such fund or holding itself out to investors as a related company for
purpose of investment or investor services; (III) any account for which the fund's
investment adviser has borrowing authority, or any natural person whom the
Commission by order shall have determined to be an interested person by reason
of having had, at any time since the beginning of the last two completed fiscal
years of the fund, a material business or professional relationship with it or with its
principal executive officer, or with any other fund having the same investment
adviser or principal underwriter, or with the principal executive officer of such
other fund.
Id. at 7 n.15.
29. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,379.
30. Chamber of Commerce Case, 412 F.3d at 137.
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adequate consideration to the costs of the two new conditions.31
The Chamber of Commerce attacked the rules on the theory that the
Commission did not have authority under the Investment Company Act
to impose conditions on the exemptions relating to mutual fund
governance 32 and on the grounds that the Commission violated the
Administrative Procedure Act in its rulemaking.33 The court rejected the
first contention, holding that the Commission's broad exemptive power
under Section 6(c) of the Act includes the power to regulate the
governance structure of investment companies.34 It also held that the
75% conditions did not conflict with Section 10(a) of the Act requiring
that 40% of the directors of an investment company be independent,
because Congress stated only that a fund may have "no more than" 60%
non-independent directors.35 These holdings were favorable to the
Commission, because they re-affirmed the Commission's power to
regulate mutual fund corporate governance.
In two other aspects of its opinion, the court's rulings were also
favorable to the SEC. Both of them addressed contentions that the
Commission violated the APA by failing to show sufficient connection
between the abuses that prompted the rule making and the new
conditions. 36
First, the court held that the prior existence of rules regulating
mutual fund board governance did not prevent the Commission from
deciding that "additional regulation was called for as a prophylactic. 37
Importantly, the court reaffirmed the Commission's authority to adopt
preventative rules under the 1940 Act by stating that "[i]n sum, the
Chamber points to nothing in the ICA to suggest the Congress restricted
the authority of the Commission to make 'precautionary or prophylactic
responses to perceived risks.'
38
Second, the court held that "the Commission's effort to prevent
future abuses of exemptive transactions was not arbitrary, capricious, or
31. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,378-46,393 (Comm'rs
Cynthia A. Glassman & Paul S. Atkins, dissenting).
32. Chamber of Commerce Case, 412 F.3d at 138.
33. Id. at 140.
34. Id. at 138.
35. Id. at 140 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2005)).
36. Id. at 140.
37. Id. at 141.
38. Id. (quoting Certified Color Mfts. Ass'n v. Mathews, 543 F.2d 284, 296 (D.C.
Cir. 1976)).
20051
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in any way an abuse of discretion, in violation of the APA. 3 9
In addition to the favorable rulings, the court provided important
guidance to the SEC regarding its obligation to consider costs in its
future rule making activities. In considering cost questions, the court
referred to Section 2(c) of the Investment Company Act requiring the
Commission to consider "whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation., 40 It described the Chamber's two
contentions in this regard as follows:
The Chamber argues that the Commission violated this mandate, and hence
the APA, by failing (1) to develop new, and to consider extant, empirical
data comparing the performance of funds respectively led by inside and by
independent chairmen; and (2) to consider the costs of the conditions it was
imposing, which costs in turn impede efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.
4 1
In a section of the opinion highly favorable to the Commission, the
court stated that the Commission was not obligated to conduct any
empirical study. After noting that "an agency acting upon the basis of
empirical evidence may more readily be able to show it has satisfied its
obligations under the APA, 4 2 it stated that the "Commission's decision
not to do an empirical study does not make that an unreasoned
decision., 43 It commented that "we are acutely aware that an agency
need not-indeed cannot-base its every action upon empirical data,
44
and it noted that "an agency may be 'entitled to conduct.., a general
analysis based upon informed conjecture."' 45 The court's holding that a
statistical study is not necessary in order to sustain a Commission rule is
39. Id.
40. Id. at 142 (quoting Investment Company Act § 2(c)). Notably, the Chamber of
Commerce did not assert that the SEC has an obligation to conduct a cost benefit analysis
nor did the court discuss "cost-benefit." See Cost-Benefit Analysis discussion supra pp.
45-46 (noting that the SEC is not obligated to comply with the President's Executive
Order mandating such consideration).
41. Chamber of Commerce Case, 412 F.3d at 142.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting Melcher v. FCC, 134 F.3d 1143, 1158 (D.C. Cir 1998)). The court
also cited Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1096, 1124 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), for the proposition that parties may bring relevant information to the agency
and FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 813-14 (1978), for the theory
that"a forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies necessarily involves
deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency." Id. The court also stated that
it would not disturb the Commissions' judgment that a statistical study presented to it was
unpersuasive. Chamber of Commerce Case, 412 F.3d at 143.
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very important, since if the SEC were required to support its rule making
by statistical data, the effect would be to deny it power to make rules in
the absence of available data.
The only cost-related position of the court's opinion that did not
support the SEC was the court's holding that the Commission failed
adequately to consider the costs of the 75% independent director
condition46 and the costs of the independent chair condition.47
With regard to the 75% independent director condition, the court
held that the fact that it was difficult to determine the costs associated
with electing independent directors "does not excuse the Commission
from its statutory obligation to determine as best it can the economic
implications of the rule it has proposed.,
48
With regard to the independent chair condition, the court criticized
the Commission for its statement that it had no "reliable basis" for
estimating the costs of the condition.49 It noted that although the
Commission may not have been able to estimate the aggregate cost to the
mutual fund industry, "it readily could have estimated the cost to an
individual fund, ' 50 and as a result could have made an assessment of the
effect of the condition "upon efficiency and competition, if not upon
capital formation. 51 It repeated its admonition that uncertainty does not
relieve the Commission of its statutory obligations "to apprise itself-
and hence the public and the Congress-of the economic consequences
of a proposed regulation before it decides whether to adopt the
measure."
52
The court also held that the SEC erred in failing to consider a
disclosure alternative that was "neither frivolous nor out of bounds., 53 It
remanded the matter to the Commission to address the cost
considerations and the disclosure alternative.54
Although the Chamber of Commerce Case was a partial loss for the
Commission, it was not a substantial defeat, because the Commission
was required only to make a reasonable estimate of costs and to consider
46. Chamber of Commerce Case, 412 F.3d at 143.
47. Id. at 143-44.
48. Id. at 143.
49. Id. at 144.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 145.
54. Id.
20051
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the disclosure alternative. On remand, the Commission considered those
questions and determined "not to modify the amendments" to the
exemptive rules.55
The Commission adopted its response to the court in the Chamber
of Commerce Case56 at a meeting held on June 29, 2005, only eight days
after the decision. In its response it stated that its consideration and
discussion in the response relied upon "the existing record and publicly
available information,, 57 that further notice and comment procedures
were unnecessary, 58 and that delay risked significant harm to investors.
59
The Commission discussed the costs and benefits resulting from the
rule amendments and "whether they would promote efficiency,
competition and capital formation." 60 With regard to Board composition,
it observed that based upon the record and publicly available
information, it had a "reliable basis upon which to consider the range of
costs associated with each of the different ways in which funds may
choose to comply with the 75 percent condition.",61 It then presented
computations of costs for finding qualified candidates, annual
compensation costs, and costs for additional services of independent
counsel.62
With regard to the independent chairman condition, the
Commission concluded that it had "a reliable basis for estimating the
costs to an individual fund associated with the independent Chairman
condition., 63 It then presented computations regarding costs that a fund
might incur for additional staff to support an independent chairman,64
and for increased compensation.65
55. Investment Company Governance, Commission Response to Remand by Court
of Appeals, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,390, 39,398 (July 7, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
270).
56. The response was approved by Commissioners Donaldson, Campos and
Goldschmel over the dissents of Commissioners Atkins and Glassman, who complained
that the Commission acted hurriedly in order to adopt the response before Chairman
Donaldson's last day in office on June 30, 2005. See Investment Company Governance,
70 Fed. Reg. at 39,403-05 (Comm'rs Glassman and Atkins, dissenting).
57. Id. at 39,391.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 49,392.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 49,392-93.
63. Id. at 49,394.
64. Id. at 49,394-96.
65. Id. at 49,395.
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In considering the cost impacts, the Commission stated:
We find the costs of the 75 percent condition and of the independent
chairman conditions are extremely small relative to the fund assets for
which fund boards are responsible, and are also small relative to the
expected benefits of the two conditions.
66
The Commission concluded that compliance with the two rules will
increase investor confidence, lead to increased market efficiency, and
encourage more efficient capital formation.6 7 In addressing benefits, the
Commission emphasized the benefits from "strong fund boards that
effectively perform their oversight role, 68 and from an independent
chairman who would be "more likely to vigorously represent investor
interests when negotiating with the fund adviser on matters such as fees
and expenses. 69
The Chamber of Commerce has filed a petition for review of the
Commission re-adoption of the two conditions to mutual fund exempted
rules, alleging that the SEC did not have a reliable record upon which to
make its determination. 70 The Chamber 7' and the two dissenting SEC
Commissioners have also objected to the short time between the court's
decision and the final rule.7 2
Whether or not the court holds that the Commission followed the
APA in adopting the final rule, the important point for this article is that
in future rule making, the Commission will most likely increase its
attentions to quantitative examination of costs and benefits, and their
impact upon "efficiency, competition, and capital formation." The
Chamber of Commerce Case makes clear that the Commission need not
conduct a statistical analysis in all cases. However, it also seems to
suggest that the Commission would be well served to do so when facts
are available. The case also provides a warning that although the
Commission is not required to conduct a cost benefit analysis under the
President's Executive Order, it should consider costs and benefits when
66. Id. at 39,395.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 39,396.
69. Id.
70. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, petition for reviewfiled (D.C. Cir. July 7, 2005)
(Case No. 05-1240).
71. Id.
72. Investment Company Governance, 70 Fed. Reg. at 39,403, 39,405. (Comm'rs
Glassman and Atkins, dissenting). This article does not discuss later proceedings relating
to the petition for review in the Chamber of Commerce Case. These proceedings remain
unresolved as of the publication date of this article.
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determining whether its actions will promote "efficiency, competition,
and capital formation." As noted above, this obligation exists not only
under the Investment Company Act, but under the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act as well.73
The SEC's Rule Making Process
SEC rules usually originate in one of the Commission's rulemaking
divisions: Market Regulation, Corporation Finance, or Investment
Management.74 The SEC's Office of the General Counsel and Office of
Economic Analysis frequently assist the rulemaking divisions in securing
Commission compliance with "applicable statutes, regulations, and
Commission policies., 75 The Office of the General Counsel reviews draft
rules and may also assist the divisions at the drafting stage.76 The Office
of Economic Analysis "provides advice and technical assistance on the
likely economic impacts of rules, on whether the proposed regulatory
approach makes economic sense, and on whether proposals and
determinations are supported by sound economic reasoning and relevant
empirical data.,
77
In a July 2002 audit of the Commission's rulemaking process, the
Commission's Inspector General made a number of observations
regarding the Commission's rule making process, some of which should
provide guidance for the Commission's rule making following the
Chamber of Commerce Case.
After reviewing twelve rules, the Inspector General noted that
Executive Order 12,86678 requires agencies to assess the costs and
benefits of regulatory alternatives. It further noted that although the
Commission complies with the order on a voluntary basis, most of the
rules reviewed did not discuss the costs and benefits of proposed
alternatives.79
The audit reported concern by some SEC officials regarding a lack
of data and the unpredictable nature of some costs.80 The audit also
reported comments by officials of the Office of Economic Analysis that
73. See discussion supra pp. 44-46.
74. Rulemaking Audit, supra note 13.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
79. Rulemaking Audit, supra note 13.
80. Id.
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at times they were not consulted early enough in the rule making process
and did not always have time to review and comment on a draft rule.
81
The audit recognized the need to strike a balance between the rule
making divisions and recommended better procedures for utilizing the
Office of the General Counsel and the Office of Economic Analysis.
82
The SEC's Regulation NMS
The SEC's recent release of its final rule for Regulation NMS
provides a good example of its attempt to conduct a rigorous cost-benefit
analysis.83
Regulation NMS contains a "series of initiatives" designed to
modernize and strengthen the national market system ("NMS") for
equity securities.84  According to the Commission, the initiatives
included:
(1) a new Order Protection Rule, which reinforces the fundamental
principle of obtaining the best price for investors when such price is
represented by automated quotations that are immediately accessible;
(2) a new Access Rule, which promotes fair and non-discriminatory
access to quotations displayed by NMS trading centers through a private
linkage approach;
(3) a new Sub-Penny Rule, which establishes a uniform quoting
increment of no less than one penny for quotations in NMS stocks equal
to or greater than $1.00 per share to promote greater price transparency
and consistency;
(4) amendments to the Market Data Rules and joint industry plans that
allocate plan revenues to self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") for
their contributions to public price discovery and promote wider and more
efficient distribution of market data; and;
(5) a reorganization of existing Exchange Act rules governing the NMS
• • 85
to promote greater clarity and understanding of the rules.
The rule, adopted on June 9, 2005,86 was originally proposed in
81. Id.
82. Id. The audit noted the existence of a "SEC Compliance Handbook" revised by
the Office of the General Counsel in 1999 and recommended that it be updated and
expanded. Id. This Handbook apparently is not a public document.
83. See generally Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,578-94 (June 29, 2005)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 201, 230, 240, 242, 249, 270).
84. Id. at 37,496.
85. Id. at 37,497.
86. Id. at 37,632.
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February of 2004,87 was followed by a supplemental request for
comment in May of 2004,88 and was re-proposed in its entirety in
December of 2004. 89  As a result of the lengthy comment period, the
Commission received substantial public input for its cost benefit and
capital formation impact analyses. 90
In its adopting release, the Commission discussed the benefits and
costs of each new or modified rule in a stand-alone section.91 Among the
87. Regulation NMS, Proposed Rules and Amendments to Joint Industry Plans, 69
Fed. Reg. 11,126 (Mar. 9, 2004).
88. Regulation NMS: Proposed Rule; Extension of Comment Period and
Supplemental Request for Comment, Exchange Act, 69 Fed. Reg. 30,142 (May 26,
2004).
89. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act, 69 Fed. Reg. 77,424 (Dec. 27, 2004).
90. The Commission's National Market System release contained the following
language justifying its rulemaking process, apparently in an effort to meet challenges of
the sort present in the Chamber of Commerce Case:
The Commission has engaged in a thorough, deliberate, and open rulemaking
process that has provided at every point an opportunity for public participation and
debate. We have actively sought out the views of the public and securities
industry participants. Even prior to formulating proposals, our review included
multiple public hearings and roundtables, an advisory committee, three concept
releases, the issuance of temporary exemptions intended in part to generate useful
data on policy alternatives, and a constant dialogue with industry participants and
investors. This process continued after the proposals were published for public
comment. We held a public hearing on the proposals in April 2004 ("NMS
Hearing") that included more than 30 panelists representing investors, individual
markets, and market participants from a variety of different sectors of the
securities industry. Because we believed that there were a number of important
developments at the public hearing, we published a supplemental request for
comment and extended the comment period on the proposals in May 2004 to give
the public a full opportunity to respond to these developments. We then carefully
considered the more than 700 comment letters submitted by the public, which
encompassed a wide range of views.
Regulation NMS, Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,497.
It continued:
In sum, the rules adopted today are the culmination of a long and comprehensive
rulemaking process. Reaching appropriate policy decisions in an area as complex
as market structure requires an understanding of the relevant facts and of the often
subtle ways in which the markets work, as well as the balancing of policy
objectives that sometimes may not point in precisely the same direction. Based on
the extensive record that we have developed over the course of the rulemaking
process, the Commission firmly believes that Regulation NMS will protect
investors, promote fair competition, and enhance market efficiency, and therefore
fulfills its Exchange Act responsibility to facilitate the development of the NMS.
Id. at 37,498.
91. See generally id. at 37,578-94.
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five categories covered in the rule,92 the Order Protection Rule, designed
to obtain best prices for investors in automated markets, provides a good
example of the manner in which the SEC can protect its rule making by a
through cost-benefit analysis.
93
The SEC first identified both the qualitative benefits and costs of
the Order Protection Rule.94 It identified benefits to investors, such as,
"promoting the best execution of customer market orders, promoting the
fair treatment of customer limit orders, and strengthening protection of
limit orders" which would serve to "minimize investor transaction
costs. ' 95 It noted its expectation that price protections would "increase
investor confidence by helping to eliminate the impression of unfairness
when a trade occurs at a price that is inferior to the investor's displayed
order" and predicted greater "investor confidence in the integrity of the
NMS. 9 6 This increased confidence was expected to increase investors'
willingness to invest in the market, and to enhance market depth and
liquidity and "the ability of listed companies to raise capital.,
97
The Commission also highlighted benefits to the competitiveness
and efficiency of the market itself. For example, it pointed out that the
rule protects trades that occur in automated markets by eliminating the
need for those markets to wait for responses from non-automated
markets.98 It predicted that as a result the rule will "level the playing
field by eliminating the potential competitive advantage the existing ITS
rule provides to manual markets" and "accommodate the realities of
92. The SEC divided the rules promulgated in NMS into five general categories:
Order Protection, Access, Sub-Penny, Market Data and Plan Amendments, and
Regulation NMS. Id. at 37,497. Generally, the Order Protection Rule requires a trading
center to implement policies to prevent "trade-throughs" of "protected quotations" on that
trading center in an effort to protect the "best bids and offers of each exchange." Id. at
37,578. The Access Rule governs access to NMS stock quotations in order to promote
fairness and non-discriminatory access. Id. at 37,497, 37,583. The Sub-Penny Rule limits
the increments used in NMS stock quotations to a minimum of $0.01 for stocks that are
priced over $1.00. Id. at 37,588. The Market Data and Plan Amendments Rule revises
the formulas for allocating market data revenues of Self-Regulatory Organizations
("SROs") that participate in joint industry plans, establishes "non-voting advisory
committees" comprised of non-SRO interested parties, and modifies the dissemination
and display of market information. Id. at 37,589. Finally, Regulation NMS makes non-
substantive modifications to existing Exchange Act rules. Id. at 37,497, 37,593.
93. See generally id. at 37,578-83.
94. Regulation NMS, Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,578-83.
95. Id. at 37,578.
96. Id. at 37,579.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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today's" markets. 99
The SEC also quantified the benefits of the Order Protection
Rule. 00 It expressed its belief that although the rule's price protections of
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ Stock Market
(NASDAQ) stocks are "difficult to quantify," benefits will be
substantial. 0 1 It provided a "conservative" estimate of an annual benefit
of $321 million based upon a calculation of the value of the "bypassed
limit orders and inferior prices for investors in 2003 that could have been
addressed by strong trade through protection."' 1 2 It indicated that since
this estimate only represented the "shortage of quoted depth," greater,
unquantifiable benefits "can be expected to result from increased use of
limit orders, increased depth, and increased order interaction."'
0 3
The SEC used an indirect approach to quantify an "enormous
potential benefit" of the Order Protection Rule. 10 4 In determining that the
rule's projected increase in market depth and liquidity will lower investor
transaction costs by $1.5 billion, the SEC focused on a specific category
of investors who should benefit from the rule changes and then
extrapolated this analysis to cover the overall market. 0 5 It estimated the
expected transaction cost savings and additional returns for equity
mutual fund shareholders, and then expanded this analysis to the
"holdings of other types of investors, including pension funds, insurance
companies, and individuals."'
10 6
In discussing costs of the Order Protection Rule, 10 7 the SEC
identified implementation costs of $143.8 million and annual
maintenance costs of $21.9 million.10 8  It said that one-time
implementation costs are required to establish and implement the policies
and procedures required by the rule and included costs for modifications
to and development of various order routing, execution and surveillance
100. See generally Regulation NMS, Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,579-81.
101. Id. at 37,579.
102. Id. To derive the $321 million estimate, the agency focused on the annual
amount of quotations that were traded through in 2003. The agency calculated that 12
billion shares were traded through at an average cost of 2.3 or 2.2 cents each for NYSE or
NASDAQ stocks, respectively. Id.
103. Id. at 37,580.
104. Id.
105. See generally id. at 37,580-81.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 37,497.
108. Regulation NMS, Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,582.
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systems, as well as establishing connectivity to other trading centers.'0 9
The Commission acknowledged that these costs are substantial, but
pointed out that the actual cost per trading center will vary depending on
the types of policies that the trading centers choose to implement and the
type of systems that they already have in place." 0 It derived the $21.9
million annual maintenance costs by identifying $3.5 million for ongoing
monitoring and enforcement activity and $18.4 million for access by
trading centers to information databases that will allow them to monitor
compliance of individual transactions with the Order Protection Rule.'
After identifying costs and benefits of the Order Protection Rule,
the SEC in a separate section discussed the rule's impact on the
promotion of market efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 12 In
conducting this analysis, the Commission sought to consider the impact
on market efficiency, competition, and capital formation of each of the
costs and benefits identified in the cost-benefit analysis and the issues
identified in comments that it received during the rulemaking process.
For example, it indicated that the increased market depth and
liquidity, discussed at length in its cost-benefit analysis, will "at a
minimum, lower the search costs associated with trying to find liquidity
and should lead to improved execution quality."" 3 It observed that the
Order Protection Rule's protection of trades in automated markets' 14 will
promote market efficiency "by more effectively linking markets together
... [by] integrating trading centers ... and by providing an incentive for
non-automated markets to automate."' ' 5 It expected this aspect of the
rule to "level" the playing field between automated and non-automated
markets leading to increased "intermarket competition" providing
"strong incentives to compete and innovate" 116 and to increase the depth
and liquidity of the more competitive trading centers.' The SEC
concluded that the increases in market efficiency, depth and liquidity,
coupled with increased investor confidence from the higher quality
executions, will allow companies to raise more capital because investors
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 37,582-83.
112. See generally id. at 37,594-97.
113. Id. at 37,594.
114. Id. at 37,579; see also text accompanying note 96.
115. Regulation NMS, Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,594.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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will be more willing to invest in the capital markets.' 18
As was the case in the adoption of the Mutual Fund Governance
rules," 9 Commissioners Cynthia A. Glassman and Paul S. Atkins
dissented from adoption of Regulation NMS. 120 In contrast to the
governance release, their written dissent was available to the
Commission majority prior to the publication of the Regulation NMS,
and the Commission release was therefore able to include a response to
the dissenting views in the NMS Release. 121 In its response to the
dissent, the Commission stated "[b]ecause the dissent appears to have
misconstrued a number of the Commission's policy positions and the
reasoning underlying them, we are including this section to clarify the
record." 122 The response presented rebuttal arguments to the dissent,
including a section dealing with "Benefits and Costs of Order Protection
Rule."' 123 By addressing the dissenting arguments in its adopting release,
the Commission increased its ability to contend that it fully considered
counter arguments.
Review of the SEC's Investor Protection Activities
The Chamber of Commerce Case raises the question whether the
Commission should be examining the impact of all of its activities on
capital formation. All of the SEC's activities can be classified as
providing protection for investors. These activities include programs
designed specifically to protect investors, a wide range of enforcement
activities, a comprehensive disclosure program, supervision of the
mutual fund and investment advisory industry, and detailed regulation of
the securities markets. Each of these areas raises questions of the SEC's
impact on capital formation.
Investor Education and Assistance
The area that causes the least interference with capital-raising is the
118. Id. at 37,595.
119. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,390-93 (Comm'rs
Glassman and Atkins, dissenting).
120. Dissent of Commissioners Cynthia A. Glassman and Paul S. Atkins to the
Adoption of Regulation NMS (2005), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51808dissent.
pdf.
121. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,601-09.
122. Id. at 37,601.
123. Id. at 37,608-09.
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Commission's investor education and assistance program. In 2003,
forty-three 124 of the Commission's staff of approximately 4,100125 were
engaged in offering investor education and assistance. That staff
receives and responds to investor complaints, offers educational events
across the country, and provides investor educational literature, such as a
series of brochures describing how to make investment choices and
warning about potential broker misconduct. 26  The SEC's investor
education and assistance program imposes no direct costs on the capital
formation process.
Investor Arbitration
Another area of activity that can be classified as "investor
protection" arises under the extensive investor securities arbitration
programs conducted by the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. (NASD), the New York Stock Exchange, and other securities
markets. 127 The primary securities arbitration program is conducted by
the NASD under the supervision of the SEC128 through NASD Dispute
124. Securities & Exchange Commission, 2003 Annual Report 30 (2003),
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep03/ar03full.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2003 Annual Report].
125. SEC Strategic Plan, supra note 15.
126. The Commission publishes and makes available on-line more than 170
brochures offering advice to investors on subjects relating to investing. See United States
Securities & Exchange Commission, Online Publications for Investors Annotated Subject
Guide, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubsannote.shtml (last modified July 26, 2005).
The only activity in this area that might be regarded as interfering with the markets is the
SEC's creation of fake websites offering spectacular returns to investors as a means of
investor education. Susan F. Wyderko, Director of the SEC Office of Investor Education
and Assistance, Testimony Concerning the Commission's Role in Empowering
Americans to Make Informed Financial Decisions Before the Subcommittee on Financial
Management, the Budget, and International Securities, Committee on Governmental
Affairs, United States Senate (Mar. 30, 1994), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony
/ts033004sfw.htm. Ms. Wyderko discussed the results of a series of SEC "fake
investment scams" that were "designed to illustrate the warning signs of an on-line
investment fraud." Id.
127. The author has a particular interest in this area because he was chair of the
Securities Arbitration Task Force of the National Association of Securities Dealers,
which conducts approximately 90 percent of investor securities arbitrations. The Task
Force published a report in 1996 making approximately 170 major and minor
recommendations to the NASD for reform of the NASD's securities arbitration system.
See NASD, Inc., Securities Arbitration Reform: Report of the Arbitration Policy Task
Force to the Board of Governors (Jan. 1996) [hereinafter Securities Arbitration Reform
Report].
128. See generally Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34
(1987).
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Resolution, a subsidiary of the NASD.
The extensive investor arbitration programs conducted by the
NASD also do not appear to have negative effects on capital formation.
The NASD program is financed by the fees received from litigants, the
majority of which are received from the securities industry through
process fees, surcharges, and assessments against NASD members.
2 9
The arbitration process is controlled by the NASD, not by the industry.
The brokerage industry has long been a strong supporter of a securities
arbitration system, in most cases requiring investors to agree to
arbitration as a condition to opening brokerage accounts. The so-called
"arbitration waiver clause" placed in customer contracts by broker-
dealers was declared valid by the Supreme Court in Shearson/American
Express v. McMahon.130  In that case, the court relied upon SEC
supervision of the securities arbitration system as a means of protecting
investors. 131
The NASD arbitration system provides a fair venue for resolving
investor claims against broker-dealers, and it does so on a cost effective
basis. It offers a special system for small claims that does not exist in the
federal courts. In cases involving larger claims, experienced arbitration
lawyers offset the advantages that repeated defenses of claims might give
to brokerage firms. The existence of the arbitration system causes most
brokerage firms to settle the more obvious cases of broker misconduct.1
32
The public benefits of the system so vastly outweigh the costs to the
brokerage industry that evaluating the costs and benefits of that system
does not seem warranted.
129. See Securities Arbitration Reform Report, supra note 124, at 141; see also
NASD, Inc., Notices to Members, No. 01-70 (Nov. 2001) (reporting amendments to
Rules 10306, 10308, 10319, and 10328 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure),
available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rulesregs/documents/noticetomembers/nas
dw_005064.pdf.
130. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-34; see also Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
131. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-34.
132. Linda D. Fienberg, President NASD Dispute Resolution, Testimony Before
the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises,
Committee on Financial Services, United States House of Representatives (Mar. 17,
2005) (reporting that only 27 percent of NASD administered arbitration cases were
decided by arbitrators. This document also provides a good description of the NASD's
dispute resolution process), http://financialservices.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode
=all&comm=l (follow 3-17-2005 hyperlink entitled "A Review of the Securities
Arbitration System").
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Commission Enforcement Actions
In many areas in which the Commission acts to protect investors,
some interference with business operations may occur. The Commission
has strong enforcement powers, including the power to bring
investigations, to sue in federal court, and to bring administrative actions
against both industry members and other persons for violating the federal
securities laws. 3 3 Sanctions may include restitution, fines, penalties and
bars prohibiting defendants from serving as officers or directors of public
companies. 134 Although Commission investigations and sanctions clearly
impose costs on investigative targets and defendants, these enforcement
actions fall in the area of justified interference with business operations.
Corporate Financial Fraud
Recent SEC enforcement cases involving corporate financial fraud
have resulted in large monetary penalties and injunctions, 35 including
orders prohibiting defendants from serving as officers or directors of
companies whose securities are registered with the SEC. 13 6 When these
actions are directed against individuals, they almost surely demonstrate
to others the desirability of acting honestly, and in any event the
penalties are usually well deserved.
When SEC actions result in penalties on corporations the analysis is
not so easy. The problem rests with the fact that in the usual case
involving fraudulently inflated earnings the fraud on securities
purchasers is perpetrated by corporate officials who make
misrepresentations. The purchasing investors have been injured and may
recover through private class action litigation or through the Sarbanes-
Oxley provisions which permit the SEC to add amounts obtained as civil
penalties to disgorgement funds available for the benefit of the victims of
securities law violations. 137 Some SEC Commissioners and others have
133. See generally DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND
ENFORCEMENT (2003).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., SEC v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., Litig. Release. No. 18,936 (Oct.
21, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18936.htm; see also
cases listed in David S. Ruder, Yuji Sun & Arek Syca, The Securities and Exchange
Commission's Pre- and Post-Enron Responses to Corporate Financial Fraud: An
Analysis and Evaluation, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1103, 1105-08 (2005).
136. See, e.g., SEC v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., Litig. Release. No. 18,891
(Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl 8891 .htm.
137. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2005).
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recently raised objections that penalties directed to corporations are too
high. 138  Their argument is that if a corporation is required to make
payments, innocent shareholders of that corporation who were not
responsible for the fraud may indirectly be paying for the fraud because
the value of their shares will be lower. This result may be seen as an
interference with capital market efficiency, but may be offset by
increased shareholder monitoring of behavior by corporate officials.
Broker-Dealer Illegal Conduct
In its enforcement program, the SEC frequently brings many actions
against brokerage firms engaged in illegal conduct. For instance, the
SEC recently entered into settlements with ten major Wall Street
investment firms that had encouraged their financial analysts to make
false recommendations to customers regarding securities of corporate
clients in order to obtain investment banking fees from those clients.
The settlements imposed large fines, mandated use of independent
analysts, and imposed conduct restrictions.
139
The SEC has recently disciplined seven broker-dealers for failure to
disclose that they received payments for providing research coverage of
certain public companies. 40 It has also disciplined five NYSE specialist
138. See, e.g., Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner SEC, Address at Charles Hamilton
Houston Lecture Series (Apr. 4, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch04O4O5
psa.htm.
139. SEC v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., Litig. Release No. 18,118 (Apr. 28,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl 8118.htm; SEC v. Morgan
Stanley & Co, Litig. Release No. 18,117 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.
sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl 8117.htm; SEC v. Lehman Bros. Inc., Litig. Release No.
18,116 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl8116.
htm; SEC v. Merrill Lynch, Litig. Release No. 18,115 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl8115.htm; SEC v. Blodget, Litig. Release No.
18,115 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl8115.
htm; SEC v. J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc., Litig. Release No. 18,114 (Apr. 28, 2003), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl81l4.htm; SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
Litig. Release No. 18,113 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/lrl8113.htm; SEC v. UBS Warburg LLC, Litig. Release No. 18,112
(Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl8112.htm; SEC
v. Citigroup Global Mkts Inc., Litig. Release No. 18,111 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl8111.htm; SEC v. Credit Suisse First Boston
LLC, Litig. Release No. 18,110 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/lrl81 10.htm; SEC v. Bear, Steams & Co., Litig. Release No. 18,109
(Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl8109.htm; see
also Stephen M. Cutler & Linda C. Thomsen, Recent SEC Enforcement Cases, Presented
at the 32nd Annual Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 2005) (on file with author).
140. In re Needham & Co., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11,603 (Aug. 25, 2004),
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firms for executing orders for their own accounts ahead of executable
public customer orders. 
141
Public discipline of brokerage firms engaged in illegal conduct
helps to promote market honesty, which in turn promotes market
efficiency. The benefits to the markets from SEC disciplinary actions
against brokers seem obvious, and it would be a highly unusual case if
costs to defendant brokerage firms would outweigh the benefits to the
securities markets.
The SEC's Disclosure Requirements
In 2003, 12,830 corporations, each having 500 shareholders and $10
million in total assets, filed annual reports, quarterly reports, and special
event reports with the SEC.14 2 These reports are made available to the
public through the SEC's electronic filing program, EDGAR.
43
The SEC's disclosure program has been subject to continuous
revision, and today imposes considerable burdens on registrants. The
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8474.pdf; In re Janney Mont-
gomery Scott LLC, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11,604 (Aug. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8475.pdf, In re Morgan Keegan & Co., Admin.
Proc. File No. 3-11,600 (Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/33-8466.htm; In re Prudential Equity Group, LLC, Admin. Proc. File
No. 3-11,601 (Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-
8469.htm; In re Adams Harkness, Inc., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11,598 (Aug. 25, 2004),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8460.htm; In re Friedman, Billings,
Ramsey & Co., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11,599 (Aug. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8461.htm; In re SG Cowen & Co., Admin. Proc.
File No. 3-11,602 (Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-
8472.pdf.
141. In re Bear Wagner Specialists LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49,498
(Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49498.htm; In re
Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49,499 (Mar. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49499.htm; In re LaBranche & Co., Exchange
Act Release No. 34-49,500 (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov
/litigation/admin/34-49500.htm; In re Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Specialists LLC,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-49,501 (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov
/litigation/admin/34-49501.htm; In re Van der Moolen Specialists USA, LLC, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-49,502 (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/34-49502.pdf; In re SIG Specialists, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-
50,076 (July 26, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004991itigation
/admin/34-50076.htm; In re Performance Specialist Group, Exchange Act Release No.
34-50,075 (July 26, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004991itigation
/admin/34-50075.htm.
142. SEC 2003 Annual Report, supra note 124, at 63.
143. See SEC Important Information about EDGAR, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/
aboutedgar.htm (last modified Feb. 3, 2005).
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program seems to have contributed markedly to transparency of
corporate operations and to resulting confidence in the United States
securities markets. Despite comments made during the rule adoption
process that these disclosures impose unnecessary costs on businesses,
the benefits to market efficiency from the SEC's required disclosures
seem to outweigh their costs, and the effect on capital formation seems to
be positive.
Over time, one aspect of the SEC's disclosure program that has
attracted substantial negative commentary has been its requirement that
businesses must file financial statements prepared in accordance with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). These accounting
principals are adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB), an independent private board to which the SEC has delegated
authority to create accounting standards. 144  In adopting accounting
standards, the FASB engages in extensive efforts to obtain the comments
of businesses. It consults with interested parties at all stages through
committees, exposure drafts, comment letters, informal contacts,
seminars, and open meetings.
45
Businesses have frequently complained that accounting
requirements unduly interfere with business operations and have
vigorously attacked required accounting rules in many areas. The FASB
is a private organization, not an independent government agency, and is
not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act and other legislation
applicable to government agencies. Since court challenges to FASB
actions are not likely to succeed, disappointed business interests have
frequently sought to have Congress interfere with FASB standard-
setting. For instance, the FASB's new rule requiring corporations to
include the cost of granting employee stock options in their earnings
reports has resulted in the introduction of several bills in Congress
seeking to revise or delay the FASB action. 146 Business criticism has
been led by high-tech Silicon Valley corporations that have become
accustomed to using stock options as a means of attracting highly
capable employees. They argue that the technological innovations in the
United States will suffer if businesses are required to include stock
144. Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC Accounting Series No. 150, 39
C.F.R. § 1260 (1974).
145. See discussion of FASB due process in David S. Ruder et al., Creation of
World Wide Accounting Standards: Convergence and Independence, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 513, 525 (2005).
146. See id. at 559-66 (discussing "Stock Options: Political Interferences in the
United States").
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option grants as an expense. In response, the FASB has defended the
new stock option standard as benefiting investors by giving a better
indication of real costs. By delegating to the FASB the power to create
accounting standards, and by exercising the oversight authority inherent
in that delegation, the SEC seems to believe that the FASB's due process
procedures provide sufficient protection against undue interference with
capital formation.
The area creating the greatest current controversy involves the costs
of disclosure requirements adopted following the recent corporate
scandals. Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,141
the SEC implemented congressionally mandated requirements that
corporate officers must certify that their corporations' financial
statements are fairly presented1 48 and must also certify that their internal
controls on financial reporting are reliable. 149  These two disclosure
requirements have been intensely criticized by businesses on the grounds
of cost. Businesses argue that the new requirements, particularly the
Section 404 internal control certifications, unnecessarily impose
enormous costs on both large and small businesses.15 ° Supporters of the
requirements maintain that the new certifications regarding the accuracy
of the financial statements are beneficial because they improve corporate
disclosures.151 They also maintain that the certifications mandated by
Section 404 will help corporations identify weaknesses in their
accounting controls and will result in better internal recording of income
and costs, with great benefits to corporate efficiency and market
disclosure.
152
In this highly contentious area, the SEC has postponed the effective
date of the internal control certification requirements to a later date for
smaller businesses, 153 and has agreed to postpone the effective date of the
147. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2004).
148. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67
Fed. Reg. 57,276 (Sept. 9, 2002); Management's Report on Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68
Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at H.C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249,
270, 274) [hereinafter 404 Rule Release].
149. 404 Rule Release, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,636.
150. See SEC, Division of Corporate Finance, Office of the Chief Accountant, Staff
Statement on Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting (May
16, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/stafficreporting.pdf.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Non-Accelerated Filers
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FASB's stock options requirement to help businesses avoid the burden of
complying with the Section 404 disclosure requirements and the new
stock option accounting requirements at the same time. 54 The SEC has
appointed a special "Advisory Committee On Smaller Public
Companies" to examine the costs of the certification requirements on
small businesses. 155
It seems likely that, because of the Chamber of Commerce Case and
business pressures, the Commission will address cost issues in greater
detail in future rulemaking related to disclosure matters.
Securities Act Registration Requirements
The Securities Act of 1933156 requires corporations selling securities
to the public to register their securities with the SEC or to find an
exemption from registration.1 57  For many years the Commission has
recognized that costs of registration can be reduced by imposing the
same disclosure requirements on corporations selling securities that are
imposed upon them in their periodic reports.158 For two decades, the
Commission has allowed larger corporations to incorporate disclosures
made in periodic filings into registration statements for sale of
securities. 1
59
In other areas of the registration process, the SEC has continually
been aware of the desirability of easing burdens. In the small business
area it has promulgated Regulation S-B, relaxing registration
requirements for small businesses, 60 and it has expanded exemption
and Foreign Private Issuers, 70 Fed. Reg. 11,528 (Mar. 8, 2005) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249).
154. Press Release No. 2005-57, SEC, Commission Amends Compliance Data for
FASB Statement No. 123R on Employee Stock Options (Apr. 14, 2005), http://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-57.htm.
155. Press Release No. 2004-174, SEC, SEC Establishes Advisory Committee to
Examine Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Smaller Public Companies (Dec. 16, 2004),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-174.htm.
156. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 1-28, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2005).
157. E.g., id. at § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (2005).
158. See, e.g., Proposed Rule Making to Implement the Integrated Disclosure
System, Securities Act Release No. 6331-6338 [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 83,016 (Aug. 6, 198 1).
159. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383
(Mar. 3, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 11380 (Mar. 16, 1982).
160. Regulation S-B, Integrated Disclosure System for Small Business Issuers, 17
C.F.R. § 228 (2005).
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requirements for small offerings. 61 It has made registration easier by
adopting shelf registration rules allowing companies to register securities
for offering on a delayed basis, 162 and by rules allowing use of term
sheets to facilitate the timing of securities offerings. 163  It has also
promulgated Rule 144A, allowing sales of unregistered securities to
institutional investors in the United States,' 64 and Regulation S,
clarifying the regulation of overseas offerings. 1
65
On July 19, 2005, the Commission issued its long awaited new rules
on Securities Offering Reform. 166  The rules involved: 1) increased
flexibility in making communications related to registered securities
offerings; 2) reduction of procedural restrictions in the registration
process; and 3) improvements in the manner of delivery of information
to investors. 167 In the portion of its proposing release 168 relating to cost
and benefits, and in the portion regarding efficiency, competition and
capital formation 169 the SEC made extensive requests for comment
regarding costs. In both the proposing and adopting releases, the
Commission stated its belief that the proposals would:
facilitate greater availability of information to investors and the market;
161. Regulation D, Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities
Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, Rules 501-08, 17 C.F.R. §§
230.501-230.508 (2005); Regulation A, Conditional Small Issues Exemptions, Rules
251-63, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.263 (2005).
162. Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, Rule 415, 17 C.F.R. §
230.415 (2005).
163. Prospectus Delivery Requirements in Firm Commitment Underwritten
Offerings of Securities for Cash, Rule 434, 17 C.F.R. § 230.434 (2005).
164. Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A
(2005).
165. Regulation S, Rules Governing Offers and Sales Made Outside the United
States Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, Rules 901-905 and
Preliminary Notes, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.905 (2005).
166. Securities Offering Reform, Release Nos. 33-8591, 34-52056, IC-26993, 2005
WL 1692642 (July 19, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 228, 229, 230, 239,
240, 243, 249, 274), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8591.pdf [hereinafter
SOR Adopting Release].
167. Chairman William H. Donaldson, Speech by SEC Chairman; Securities
Offering Reform: Opening Statement Before the SEC Open Meeting (June 29, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch062905whd.htm.
168. Securities Offering Reform, Proposed Rule, Release Nos. 33-8501, 34-50624,
IC-26649, 2004 WL 2610458 at 103 (Nov. 3, 2004). Cost Benefit Analysis (Nov. 3,
2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 67,392, 67,450-56 (Nov. 17, 2004). [hereinafter SOR Proposing
Release].
169. Investment Company Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c) (2005).
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" eliminate barriers to open communications;
* reflect the increased importance of electronic dissemination of
information;
* make the capital formation process more efficient; and
" define more clearly the information against which seller's statement are
evaluated for liability purposes.1
70
Although it might have been expected that in its final release, issued
after the Chamber of Commerce Case decision, the Commission would
have included a greatly expanded quantitative analysis of cost benefits, it
did not do so. Instead it emphasized that the offering of reform rules was
intended to ease the burden of securities registration, with resulting
reductions in costs and improvement in capital formation. 171  In its
quantitative analysis, it supported its new approach with summary
statistics estimating annual reduction in securities offering compliance
costs by $87,664,000172 and annual cost savings from the "access equals
delivery" provision at $130,753,000.1 73 Since the primary objective of
the new rules was to ease burdens on registration, the Commission
undoubtedly viewed an attack on its rule-making as remote.
Mutual Fund Enforcement and Rule Making
The mutual fund scandals involving late trading, market timing, and
portfolio disclosures caused the SEC to engage in a vigorous mutual fund
enforcement program and to adopt new rules developed to foster better
fund governance.174 The most intrusive of these rules requires each fund
to have a chief compliance officer and places detailed responsibilities on
funds to create programs that will permit them to supervise the
compliance programs of their adviser, sub-advisers, and service
170. Cost Benefit Analysis, 69 Fed. Reg. at 67,450; SOR Adopting Release, supra
note 166, at 274, 298.
171. SOR Adopting Release, supra note 166, at 274-97.
172. Id. at 290 (utilizing an "average hourly cost of issuers personal time at $125,
without an estimate of the number of hours to be sold").
173. It reached this figure by estimating that in 75% of 232.45 million instances in
which broker dealers will be able to rely on the rule, the cost saved will be $0.75 per
prospectus. Id. at 290. The assumption that an investor will request a prospectus only
25% of the time may, of course, cast some doubt on the benefits of the reform to
investors.
174. Investment Company Governance Release, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 4,
2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt 270).
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providers, such as custodians and shareholder record keepers. 17 5 Neither
the compliance rules nor other rules imposing restrictions on fund and
adviser activities have been seriously challenged as failing to make a
sufficient cost analysis or as interfering with efficiency, competition, or
capital formation. In the future, the court's statement in the Chamber of
Commerce Case that the SEC should "determine as best it can the
economic implications" of its rule making'76 can be expected to cause
greater Commission focus on cost and capital formation elements in
mutual fund and investment adviser rule making. Nevertheless,
successful challenges to mutual fund rules on economic grounds seem
unlikely, given the fact that the D.C. Circuit Court has accepted the
SEC's position in the mutual fund area and Congress has not restricted
the Commission's ability to "make 'precautionary or prophylactic
responses to perceived risks.""
177
Market Regulation
One of the SEC's primary tasks is to supervise the operations of the
securities markets. 178  It has imposed a series of market rules and
regulations designed to protect investors. In doing so, the SEC has been
rightly concerned that its market regulation activities should not interfere
with market efficiency. It has been slow to adopt rules regulating the
markets and has been particularly careful not to interfere with
technological advances when adopting restrictive rules. Nevertheless,
after new technologies emerge, the SEC regularly promulgates rules
designed to promote fairness to investors.
The SEC recently introduced order routing reforms requiring broker
dealers to include customer limit orders in their quotations and to
exercise customer limit orders before filing their own orders. 7 9 It has
recognized special problems associated with the existence of electronic
communication networks (ECNs), and has passed regulations relating to
oversight of those trading vehicles, including requirements allowing
175. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers,
Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714 (Dec. 24, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 270, 275,
279).
176. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
177. Id. at 141 (quoting Certified Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. F. David Mathews, 543 F.2d
284, 296 (1976)).
178. In 1975, Congress required the SEC to "facilitate the creation of a National
Market System," 1934 Exchange Act § 11A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-i (2005).
179. Order Execution Obligations, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,290 (Sept. 12, 1996).
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investor access to ECNs that maintain high volume markets.180 The SEC
has raised problems relating to market concentration and market
fragmentation, and as discussed above, has recently adopted Regulation
NMS, which is "designed to modernize and strengthen the national
market system ... for equity securities.
' i8 1
Since technical SEC initiatives may have negative effects on the
securities markets, market rules are adopted only after giving the
securities industry ample opportunity to comment. These comments
usually reveal the intense competitive concerns of the NYSE, the
NASDAQ Stock Market, the regional stock exchanges, and the ECNs.
Evaluation of the costs of SEC market reforms is extremely difficult, and
their effects may not be known until a later time. In this area of SEC
activity, the lengthy rule making process is likely to support Commission
contentions that securities market rule making reforms promote rather
than hinder market efficiency. 
182
Conclusion
When the SEC seeks to protect investors, it also recognizes its
obligation to "maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets" and to
"facilitate capital formation." 183 The Chamber of Commerce Case and
its aftermath undoubtedly will result in greater SEC attention to its duties
to facilitate capital formation in the future, not only in its rule making,
but also in its other activities. In general, the Commission's activities in
pursuit of investor protection are aligned with market efficiency and
capital formation, since honest markets are better markets. Capital
formation goals seem to be easily met by the SEC's investor education
and arbitration supervision activities, because these activities do not
interfere with market operations. They also seem to be met by the SEC's
anti fraud enforcement, broker dealer discipline, and mutual fund
regulation because of the great benefits accruing from honest markets.
Likewise, the benefits accruing to investors and the markets from
the Commission's disclosure program, including FASB accounting rules,
and the regulation of the securities distribution process seem to promote
180. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading ,Systems, 63 Fed. Reg.
70,844-01 (Dec. 22, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 202, 240, 242, 249).
181. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 29, 2005) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 2001, 230, 240, 242, 249, 270).
182. See id. at 37,497-98 (Commission's description of its rulemaking process
when it adopted Regulation NMS).
183. See SEC Strategic Plan, supra note 15, at 4.
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the Commission's market efficiency and capital formation goals.
The greatest possibility that SEC regulations may impede capital
formation may lie in the Commission's oversight of the securities
markets. In the market area, the Commission's careful, go slow
approach, coupled with the likelihood that market participants will make
forceful comments in furtherance of their competitive interests, makes it
likely that market efficiency goals will be achieved, and the
Commission's statutory obligation to promote capital formation will be
met.
In conclusion, the Securities and Exchange Commission's programs
promoting honesty and integrity in the securities markets have the effect
of enhancing market liquidity, and therefore are likely to meet the
Commission's obligations to maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets
and to facilitate capital formation. Nevertheless, given the comment by
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals that the Commission must
determine the "economic implications" of its rule making, the SEC in the
future will be well served in its rule making to demonstrate economic
effects through quantitative and statistical analysis of costs and benefits
and impacts on capital formation.
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